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INTRODUCTION
"If you build it, they will come."' This phrase is often used to
promote city projects to build or expand convention center space,
but it does not always ring true.2 Regardless of the success or failure
of such projects, they are expensive endeavors.' While states regularly
give funds for such projects,4 hotel tax revenues often supplement
these funds. Given the uncertain projected benefits of these projects,
local hotels can be disadvantaged by collecting the taxes. Some ho-
tels have challenged these tax assessments as unconstitutional, but
most have been unsuccessful. The decisions upholding these hotel
taxes can be difficult to justify when examining the true benefits and
burdens of convention center projects.
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I Rachel Gecker, Field of Broken Dreanu, SUCCESSFUL MEETINGS, Sept. 1, 2003, at
http://www.successmtgs.com/successmtgs/search/search-display.jsp?vnu-content.id= 1957331.
2 See id. ("[T]he reality for many cities with new or recently expanded convention centers is
not so rosy.").
3 See, e.g., Gail Rippey, Authority Sends Letter Threatening to Sue Hoteliers, SUNDAY NEWS (Lan-
caster, Pa.), Dec. 22, 2002, at Al (describing the progression of a $100 million convention cen-
ter project).
4 See, e.g.,Joel Berg, Ripple or Cripple Effect, CENT. PENN BUS.J., May 9, 2003, at 1, 17 (showing
a project timeline where then-Governor Tom Ridge pledged $15 million to the convention cen-
ter project in Lancaster, Pennsylvania).
5 Many other terms may be used to represent a "hotel tax," including "bed tax," "transient
occupancy tax," "hotel rooms tax," "tourist room tax," "tourist development tax," "accommoda-
tions tax," "hotel room occupancy tax," "innkeepers tax," "transient room tax," "rental occu-
pancy tax," "hotel occupancy tax," and "lodging tax." SeeJeff Nemerofsky, Sleepless Over the Hotel
Tax, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 527 n.1 (2001) (citations omitted). This Comment will use the term
"hotel tax."
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Part I of this Comment examines the recent history of develop-
ment in urban areas, particularly in urban tourism development. In
addition, Part I explores the support and funding of convention cen-
ter projects, focusing on the controversial use of hotel taxes. In Part
II, I explore the performance of convention center projects com-
pared to projected results and the implications of increased hotel
taxes. Part III presents the current landscape of U.S. constitutional
challenges to hotel taxes. Finally, in Part TV, I illustrate the issues that
emerge from recent decisions involving challenges to the use of hotel
taxes to fund convention center projects. Specifically, I examine
Pennsylvania cases, where all but one court ruled the hotel tax use
constitutional. In conclusion, I recommend a change to the bene-
fit/burden analysis in due process and equal protection challenges
and a reconsideration of the presumption of constitutionality with
public/private convention center projects involving adjoining hotels.
I. URBAN DEVELOPMENT
A. Background
Over the Past few decades, many cities have undergone an "urban
renaissance." In 1976, Boston opened its famous Quincy Market. At
a cost of more than $40 million, the renovation of three 150-year-old
market buildings in downtown Boston exceeded retail sales expecta-
tions.' Similarly, Baltimore revitalized its downtown at Inner Harbor
by opening Harborplace and the National Aquarium in the early
1980s.8 The changing landscape of cities from manufacturing to ser-
vice centers spurred such efforts to redevelop urban areas.9
Recognizing this shift away from manufacturing, cities have devel-
oped a "corporate center strategy" consisting of "financial, adminis-
trative, and professional services and 'an orientation toward luxury
6 See DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC
POLICY 370-81 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining the growth initiatives, specifically tourism develop-
ment and service growth, of many cities, including Boston, Atlanta, and Baltimore).
7 See id. at 370-71 ("Quincy Market would have to produce retail sales comparable to the
most successful suburban shopping malls ($150 per square foot) to justify its unusually high
development costs. Quincy Market shocked the experts by producing sales of $233 per square
foot in its first year ....").
8 See id. at 378-80 ("Harborplace succeeded beyond anyone's expectations, attracting 18
million visitors the first year (like Quincy Market, it outpulled Disneyland), earning $42 million,
and creating 2,300jobs.... By 1992 more than 15 million visitors had toured the aquarium's
exhibits....").
9 See id. at 375-78 (describing the change over the last century of cities as "centers of manu-
facturing production" to "centers of high-level corporate services"). Between 1970 and 1997,
the percentage of employees in services increased from 18.4 to 35.6; whereas, during the same
period, the percentage of employees in manufacturing decreased from 30.1 to 12.5. Id. at 376.
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consumption that is appealing to young corporate managers, edu-
cated professionals, convention goers, and the tourist trade." 0 An
important part of this "corporate center strategy" is the development
of the tourism and entertainment industry." The positive image of
this industry stems from the belief that it is "the industry without a
smokestack," i.e., it is "assumed that tourists spend money without
taking anything out of the local economy". 2 Venturing into this "ur-
ban tourism" market can involve building "convention centers, sports
stadiums, festival malls, and gaming casinos. While Boston and Bal-
timore focused on retail sales with Quincy Market and Harbor place,
cities are now also looking to attract meetings and conventions.
There has been a tremendous increase in the construction of con-
vention centers and exhibit space since the 1970s.15  Furthermore,
this market is expected to grow by almost thirty percent, or nearly six-
teen million square feet of exhibit space, by 2006.16 Those cities
planning either to build new convention center space 17 or to expand
existing space 8 are attempting to capture a piece of the large meet-
ings and conventions market.' However, the demand for convention
10 Id. at 378. Judd and Swanstrom illustrate this strategy using Baltimore's revitalization ef-
fort:
Baltimore is an excellent test case of the corporate center strategy because it is there
that the strategy was applied consistently over an extended period of time to revitalize a
depressed downtown .... "Their [public and private sector] strategy, established at the
outset, has been to convert the heart of the city into a culturally rich, architecturally ex-
citing magnet where both affluent and middle-class families will choose to work, shop,
and live." ... Baltimore is one of the nation's most successful examples of the corporate
center strategy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
1 See id. at 382 (describing how cities develop tourism strategies).
12 Id.
Is Id.
14 For example, many cities in Pennsylvania have built, or are planning to build, convention
centers. See infra Part IV.
15 SeeJUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 6, at 383 ("Between 1970 and 1985 more than 100
convention centers were constructed in the United States .... By July 1998, 409 convention
centers with exhibition space were operating in U.S. cities, and more than 70 percent of them
had opened since 1970."); Heywood T. Sanders, Convention Myths and Markets: A Critical Review
of Convention Center Feasibility Studies, 16 ECON. DEV. Q. 195, 195 (2002) [hereinafter Sanders,
Myths and Markets] ("The national total of convention hall exhibit space has grown dramati-
cally.., from 25 million square feet of exhibit space in 1980 to 40.4 million in 1990 and 53.7
million in 2001.").
16 Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 195.
17 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the plans to construct a new convention center
in Lancaster, Pennsylvania).
18 See, e.g., id. at 16 (mentioning the expansion of Baltimore's convention center in 1997).
19 In 1992, "25,000-plus associations.., spent $32 billion for meetings... and corporations
spent an additional $29 billion on off-premises meetings and conventions." JUDD &
SWANSTROM, supra note 6, at 383.
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center space has not kept pace with the increasing supply.2" Too of-
ten, city politicians promote convention center growth without un-
derstanding the complete economic picture.2'
B. Funding and Support
Convention center projects typically involve public funding and
subsidies.2 Whether for the construction of a new convention center
or for the expansion of an existing one, a common source of public
23funding comes in the form of hotel taxes. Hotel taxes are com-
monly "ad valorem" taxes, which are a percentage of the hotel room
price added to the room price, but they can also be "unit" taxes,
which represent a fixed amount in addition to the hotel room price.24
Overall taxes paid by hotel guests may also include a local general
sales tax.25 The national average hotel tax is 12.36%26 and, a city rein-
vests, on average, 37% of this revenue in its travel and tourism indus-
20 See discussion infra Part IIA (describing the realities of supply and demand in the conven-
tion center context).
21 See Martha Cooke, Wide Open Spaces, MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS, Dec. 1, 2002, at 48
("Sometimes a city's leadership, rather than demand, provides the impetus for building ....
'There's a larger political imperative that has little to do with the meetings industry.'" (quoting
Heywood T. Sanders)).
See Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 208 ("Convention centers are almost in-
variably public projects.... [built because of] the investment of hundreds of millions of public
dollars .. ").
23 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 48-13-51(a)(3.1) (2004) (involving an "excise tax on [hotel]
rooms, lodging, and accommodations" for the purpose of "funding, supporting, acquiring, con-
structing, renovating, improving, and equipping buildings, structures, and facilities, including,
but not limited to, a trade and convention center, exhibit hall.... ."); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-9-2.5-
7.7(b) (West 2000) ("The county treasurer shall deposit in the convention center operating
fund the amount of money received" from authorized hotel taxes.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§91A.390(l) (Michie 2003) ("[T]he local governing body may impose a special [hotel]
tax... for the sole purpose of meeting the operating expenses of a convention center."); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.09(A)(4)(b) (Anderson 2003) ("[R]evenue from the increase in [the
hotel] rate shall be pledged and contributed to a convention facilities authority... and be used
to pay costs of constructing, expanding, maintaining, operating, or promoting a convention
center. ... "); 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2399.23(c) (West 2001) ("Eighty per centum of reve-
nues to be received from [the authorized hotel] taxes... shall be annually deposited.., for the
use of the authority for convention center purposes.").
24 AM. ECON. GROUP, INC., IMPACT OF ROOM TAX INCREASES ON THE LODGING INDUSTRY 8
(Am. Hotel Found. 1998). In 1990, hotel taxes in New York City involved a 19.25% ad valorem
tax and a $2 per day unit tax. Ellen Perlman, Tourists Begin to Check out the Soaring Taxes on
Trave4 GOVERNING, Jan. 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Perlman, Tourists], LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GOVERN File.
25 AM. ECON. GROUP, INC., supra note 24, at 8.
26 Travel Indus. Ass'n of Am., Domestic Research: Taxes (listing the travel-related taxes,
including hotel taxes, for America's top fifty destination cities in 1998), at http://www.tia.org/
travel/taxes.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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try. Spending hotel tax revenue on convention center facilities
ranks third in cities' spending of the hotel tax, behind only spending
on their general funds and their convention and visitors' bureaus.
While some view raising hotel taxes as a painless method of increas-29• 30
ing revenues,29 it is not always as successful as envisioned.
To promote the use of public funds, both public and private sec-
tor leaders advance the notion that developing urban tourism will
benefit everyone in the surrounding area.3 ' These supporters include
"local public officials and influential business leaders," as well as "real
estate developers, local media, labor leaders, and others who have ar ,,32
stake in the value of local real estate and economic performance.
These supporters claim prosperity for everyone using the logic out-
lined byJudd & Swanstrom:
A healthy tax base is necessary to maintain the public services and infra-
structure that the local economy and residents rely on; a healthy tax base,
in turn, requires rising land values and business prosperity; in order to at-
tract private investment, a city must offer a good business climate and
special incentives that make it less expensive for mobile investors to lo-
cate there than in other cities; an increasing volume of private invest-
ment begins the cycle all over again, resulting in rising land values, a
healthy tax base, better services, and a better business climate. Built into
the logic underlying this argument.., is the assumption that cities must
33be actively involved in creating the conditions for growth .
Not only do the supporters push for public funding, but they can also,, 34
be "intolerant of opposition" to the growth initiative. When local
27 Id. ("[S]ome cities... reinvest most of that revenue into tourism development and pro-
motion, such as convention centers, cultural programs, welcome centers and travel-related
marketing.").
28 Id. (charting the national average for all travel taxes).
See Ellen Perlman, Taxing Travelers to the Hilt, GOVERNING, Dec. 1994, at 20 [hereinafter
Perlman, Taxing Travelers] ("To politicians, the attraction of tourism taxes is that for the most
part they don't fall on their own constituents. Exporting taxes to visitors would seem to be a
relatively painless way to diversify the tax base and increase revenues."); Perlman, Tourists, supra
note 24, at 4 ("Because of political pressures on other revenue sources, raising taxes on hotel
and motel rooms ... is a relatively painless way for municipalities to diversify their tax base and
find extra revenue .... Tourists, after all, don't vote in local elections.").
30 For example, after New York City's hotel tax was increased to over 19% to help reduce the
state deficit, the city experienced a downturn in visitors. See Perlman, Taxing Travelers, supra
note 29, at 20 (describing the decrease of meetings held in New York City, including the loss of
the Professional Convention Management Association's business). New York eventually re-
pealed a portion of the hotel tax in 1994 to avoid reducing overall tax revenues. Id. "One study
showed that although the state would have collected $463.2 million in tax revenue from the
hotel tax between 1990 and 1996, it would have lost $962.8 million in sales and other taxes."
Id.; see also discussion of hotel tax impact infra Part II.B.
31 JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 6, at 373.
32 Id. (referring to these supporters as "political coalitions" and "growth machines").
33
Id. (footnote omitted).
34 Id. at 374. For example, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the local media support for the con-
vention center project even involved demands to sue the local hotels opposed to the use of ho-
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media favor a convention center project, as they often do, the general
public cannot make an informed decision about the project's feasibil-
ity because the media coverage paints an overly-positive picture and
avoids negative opinions and facts.35
II. REALITIES OF CONVENTION CENTERS AND HOTEL TAXES
A. Convention Centers
Cities gain support for the construction or expansion of conven-
tion centers using the familiar rhetoric: "[i]ore space means more
convention attendees, producing more spending, new jobs, and pri-
vate development." 6 To defend this position, many cities pay na-
tional accounting firms or economic research firms to develop feasi-
bility studies that forecast positive results from increased convention37
space. Feasibility studies typically estimate demand for convention
center space as growing between 5% and 8% per year."' The actualdata, however, support no such pattern of growth in demand.39 In
tel taxes to fund the project. Editorial, Turning the Tables, SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), Dec.
15, 2002, at P2 ("It's about time to get tough with the Gang of 11 [hotels suing over the hotel
tax].... Sue 'em.").
See, e.g., Sue Dorrin, Letter to the Editor, Costly Convention Center, LANCASTER NEW ERA,
Dec. 21, 2002, at A14 ("[One] can find the convention center in print almost every day (...
Lancaster Newspapers has a vested interest in the project), yet it took the filing of this latest suit
to discover the price tag has skyrocketed by $25 million. When were we, the taxpayers, sup-
posed to find out the truth?"); Len Eiserer, Letter to the Editor, Anti-HotelierEditorials Criticized,
SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), Dec. 22, 2002, at P3 (noting the Lancaster newspapers' involve-
ment in the convention center project and asserting that "[rleaders have a right to expect edi-
torials that reflect opinions based solely upon what's perceived to be best for Lancaster").
Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 195.
37 See id. (calling the analyses "invariably positive"). Heywood T. Sanders, professor and
chair of the Public Administration Department at the University of Texas at San Antonio and a
national expert on convention centers, examined over thirty convention center feasibility stud-
ies developed by consultants from various firms, including PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG
Peat Marwick, Economics Research Associates, Pannell Kerr Forster, and Deloitte & Touche.
See id. app. at 209-10 (listing market and feasibility studies reviewed). Although termed "feasi-
bility studies," Sanders argues that "[tihe analyses of proposed local convention centers are
technically not 'feasibility studies,' because they contain no substantive forecasts of revenues
and expenditures. However, they do sustain the arguments of convention-center promoters
with a remarkably similar set of arguments and analyses." Heywood T. Sanders, Convention Cen-
terFollies, THE PUB. INTEREST, at 58, 60 n.1 (1998) [hereinafter Sanders, Follies].
38 See Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 196 (citing several feasibility studies).
Id. at 197. Sanders questions the feasibility studies' use of the available data:
Two factors stand out in the [feasibility] studies' evaluations of national convention
demand. First, a number of consultants have made use of essentially the same data from
Meetings & Conventions [Magazine, which showed no pattern on growth] .... Yet their
forecasts ... have not followed the actual performance of the event count and atten-
dance measures. Second, much of the analytical language is similar, in some cases pre-
cisely the same, from study to study. The tendency to describe relatively short-time pe-
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fact, the demand growth has decreased while supply growth has con-
tinued to increase.4 Despite recognizing the increased supply of
convention center space, consultants nonetheless recommend that
cities "build or expand to keep up with the competition and maintain
their market share. 4 ' A notable exclusion from these feasibility stud-
ies is any comparison of alternatives to the convention center plan.
After cities use these feasibility studies to make predictions and
recommendations, they use them to plan the construction and fund-
ing of convention centers. However, the actual results achieved from
convention centers are often far below the numbers promised in
these studies.4  Despite these failed promises, cities continue to rely
riod change as indicative of longer term demand performance... is also particularly
misleading.
Id. Sanders also questions the use of demand data from the annual Tradeshow Week 200 because
this publication tracks only the 200 largest conventions each year. Id. at 199 ("[T]he Tradeshow
Week 200 data have a clear upward bias in that they follow the largest and most successful events
each year. Tradeshows that lag or fail drop out of the compilation, whereas rapidly growing
events are included as they reach appropriate sizes.").
40 See Cooke, supra note 21, at 51 ("'Demand growth is not at the level it had been, but sup-
ply growth is at unprecedented levels.'" (quoting Robert Canton of PricewaterhouseCoopers)).
41 Charles V. Bagli, A Convention Center Race May Spawn Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at C8;
see also Cooke, supra note 21, at 48 ("Exacerbating the surge [in supply] have been various mar-
ket studies touting larger centers as the panacea to revitalize lackluster business dis-
tricts .... 'The landscape is dotted with cities that built convention centers to rejuvenate down-
towns, and I can't think of a single example where it worked.'" (quoting Doug Ducate,
president of the Center for Exhibition Industry Research)). A 1993 feasibility study for Wash-
ington, D.C. recognized increased supply, but concluded that "markets not increasing their
supply of exhibit space to meet the increased size demands of expositions could fail to attract
the lucrative business of the larger events." Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 202
(quoting a Deloitte & Touche feasibility study). In a second feasibility study for Washington,
D.C. in 1997, the expansion of convention centers in other cities "was not seen as portending
an imbalance in supply. Rather, 'these cities have generally recognized that larger facilities will
be required to accommodate incremental growth.., and that larger and more modern facili-
ties will likely be necessary to attract incremental levels of even business, to remain competi-
tive.. . .'" Id. at 202-03 (quoting a Coopers & Lybrand feasibility study).
42 See Sanders, Follies, supra note 37, at 63 ("While some studies compare new or expanded
centers to a 'no expansion' alternative, they almost never extend their analysis beyond the nar-
row issue of more convention space.").
43 See id. at 63-69 (comparing the promised results of feasibility studies to the actual results
in Houston, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Providence, Philadelphia, and Boston). For exam-
ple, the 1981 feasibility study used to support the construction of a new convention center in
Houston projected an annual attendance of 700,000. The actual attendance at the new conven-
tion center, which opened in 1987, was 180,687 in 1994, 186,576 in 1995, and 276,318 in 1996.
Id. at 64. Similarly, Los Angeles used a 1983 feasibility study to support the expansion of the
Los Angeles Convention Center. This study projected an attendance of 2.32 million in the first
year after expansion, increasing to 3.7 million thereafter. The actual attendance for the three
years following expansion in 1993 was 1.18 million, 1.3 million, and 1.83 million, respectively,
which was roughly the same level as before the expansion. Id. at 65 (noting the fiscal impact of
the failed expectations as an "annual shortfall in debt service and operating expense... [of]
some $20 million" that is "paid out of general city funds that might have been used for other
local public needs").
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on feasibility studies to support the construction or expansion of lo-
cal convention center space:
[T]hese feasibility studies have rarely been subject to serious review and
examination. Their conclusions and forecasts are rarely reexamined for
accuracy and reliability. And their data, methodologies, and substantive
conclusions are effectively never subject to comprehensive or compara-
tive analysis.
... Just as there is no mechanism for evaluating, critiquing, or inde-
pendently assessing the feasibility studies, there is rarely a local institu-
tion or process for evaluating the performance or impact of convention
centers. When centers fail to produce the attendance, hotel use, and visi-
tor spending predicted, there is little political accountability and no real
performance review. Convention center failure or underperfor-
mance ... is thus followed by more consultant studies, which in turn call
for even more: more exhibit space; more hotel rooms (increasingly with
public subsidy); more amenities; and more public investment.., to sup-
port the competitive positions of convention centers.44
Not only must cities begin to recognize the shortcomings of these
feasibility studies, but courts determining the benefits of convention
center projects must also be wary of the expected results in these
studies.45
A convention center that falls short of expectations can have seri-
ous implications for the surrounding community. In addition to hav-
ing an underused "big box," in some cases, local taxpayers will have
to pay for any deficit caused by the convention center's failure to at-
tract the predicted number of conventioneers. 46 Funding of a con-
vention center project also comes at the expense of other city revitali-
zation efforts. Opponents of convention center projects argue that "a
city would fare much better by rebuilding neighborhoods and creat-
ing retail districts" and that "officials should think of their own resi-
dents first and rebuild the city to attract them, instead of convention-
eers. ' 47  Understanding the realities of past convention center
44 Sanders, Myths and Markets, supra note 15, at 196, 209. Interestingly, Sanders has never
encountered a feasibility study that advised against a convention center project. Patricia A.
Poist, Critics Say: Don't Believe the Hype, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Apr. 29, 2004, at Al (discussing
Sanders's examination of feasibility studies).
45 See discussion infra Part IV (describing Pennsylvania cases involving constitutional chal-
lenges to hotel taxes funding convention center projects).
46 See, e.g., Poist, supra note 44 (indicating that Lancaster County taxpayers will have to pay
for the convention center project if it fails because the County Commissioners guaranteed $40
million in bonds funding the project); Sanders, Follies, supra note 37, at 65 (discussing the $20
million "annual shortfall in debt service and operating expense" for the bigger convention cen-
ter in Los Angeles that "is paid out of general city funds that might have been used for other
local public needs").
47 Poist, supra note 44.
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projects48 should enable cities to plan their revitalization efforts more
effectively by considering not only the shortcomings of convention
center feasibility studies but also alternatives to building a convention
center.
B. Hotel Taxes
As previously discussed, it is common for a state to authorize the
use of hotel taxes to help fund a convention center.4 9  Local politi-
cians view a hotel tax as a way of insulating the local residents from
the burden of funding the project, but the politicians may overlook
the overall impact that increasing hotel taxes has on local jobs, sales,
and other tax revenues. The impact of hotel guests on a local econ-
omy is not limited to the guests' direct spending on the hotel room
and the accompanying tax:
The full economic impact [begins] with hotel guests' direct spend-
ing .... on rooms and.., on a long list of items that included food and
beverages, transportation, shopping, amusements, and various services in
hotels and elsewhere. Sponsors of conventions and meetings at hotels,
and those attending the meetings or conventions also purchased food;
rented equipment, exhibit space, and meeting rooms; hosted hospitality
suites; and bought a variety of business services.
... [The] circuit of economic activity... begins when overnight
guests purchase their full complement of goods and services. From those
receipts, hotels, restaurants, theaters, stores, etc. pay wages to their em-
ployees and make purchases from suppliers .... Suppliers, in turn, pur-
chase goods and services from their own suppliers ....
During the process, all suppliers pay wages and other income to their
employees, owners, etc. The households of workers then purchase a full
complement of household goods and services as well as becoming over-
night hotel guests beginning the circuit again.51
The American Economics Group, Inc., funded by the American
Hotel Foundation, studied the impact of hotel tax increases on these
often-overlooked indirect areas. In 1997, hotel guests directly spent
48 Sanders points out:
[Flor all of the public dollars spent, few cities appear to have been saved by larger con-
vention centers. For all of the persistent rhetoric of new jobs, new spending, and "eco-
nomic multipliers," much of the evidence suggests that convention centers deliver far
less than promised. Indeed, in a number of cases, the expenditure of hundreds of mil-
lions of public dollars appears to have had almost no impact on individual communities.
Sanders, Follies, supra note 37, at 59.
49 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (providing statistics and examples of state
authorization).
50 AM. ECON. GROUP, INC., supra note 24, at 8.
51 Id. at 12 (references to diagrams omitted).
52 See id. (using 1997 data to determine the effect of hotel tax increases on jobs, wages, sales,
and other tax revenues). It should be noted that when a portion of the hotel tax is used for
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$303.9 billion nationwide, maintaining 12.4 million jobs and their as-
sociated $282.3 billion in wages and creating $215 billion in indirect
sales.5  The impact study concluded that a 2% increase in the na-
tional hotel tax would result in a loss of approximately 536,000 jobs,
$11.4 billion in wages, $39.6 billion in total sales, and $280.2 million
in state and local tax revenues.54 To help each state evaluate the im-
pact of increasing hotel taxes, this study breaks down the national re-
sults into state-specific results. For example, a 2% increase in Penn-
sylvania's hotel tax would result in a loss of approximately 10,200
jobs, $187.4 million in wages, $596.7 million in total sales, and $21.2
million in tax revenues. The study highlights the need for local
politicians to consider not only the increase in the hotel tax revenues,
but also the possible negative effects that an increased hotel tax will
have on other aspects of the local economy.
III. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO HOTEL TAXES
A. Basic Challenges
Four U.S. constitutional challenges have been advanced against
the enactment of hotel taxes56 based on the following provisions: the• 57
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Commerce
Clause, 59 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.6°  These chal-
lenges have largely been unsuccessful, and neither the United States
Supreme Court nor any of the United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
travel-related purposes (e.g., to allow a local convention and visitor bureau to promote travel to
the area), the impact of that portion of the tax is less negative. Id. at 8.
53 Id. at 33. This study distinguishes between "direct economic impact," which "results from
the spending by overnight guests and meeting sponsors," and "indirect impact," which "follows
from the subsequent spending of hotels, retailers, restaurants, etc. on goods and services from
their suppliers." Id. at 12.
54 Id. at 33. Although hotel tax revenues would increase by $1.208 billion, tax revenues from
other sources, including affected suppliers and workers, would decrease by $1.488 billion;
therefore, the overall result is a loss of $280.2 million in tax revenues. Id.
This study determined the expected losses by calculating the expected decrease in hotel oc-
cupancy from "fewer or shorter meetings, fewer overnight visitors, and shorter stays," the de-
crease in "sales of all affected industries and in the incomes of their owners and employees,"
and the corresponding decrease in state and local taxes. Id. at 6.
55 Id. at 71.
Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 527.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State... deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
58 Id. ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . ").
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power To... regulate Com-
merce... among the several States .... ").
60 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
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peals have addressed the constitutionality of hotel taxes. 6' The
United States District Courts have considered the issue only a few
times. 62 In fact, these constitutional challenges are usually brought
in state courts. s The difficulty in challenging hotel taxes, or any state
or local tax, begins with the initial presumption of constitutionality.
64
There is a "familiar proposition that statutes.., enjoy a presumption
of constitutionality. Moreover, 'in taxation, even more than in other
fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.' ... It
may be a leading reason why our tax system is so inhospitable to tax-
payers." 65 Consequently, the person challenging the hotel tax has the
burden of proving its invalidity.66 To understand why these forms of
challenges alone are typically insufficient to invalidate a hotel tax, it is
important to understand how they have or could be argued.
1. Equal Protection Clause
Challenging a hotel tax under the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires a showing that: "(1) at least two classes are created by the stat-
ute; (2) the classes are treated differently under the statute; and (3)
the difference in treatment cannot be justified."67 Because states have
been afforded great freedom in enacting taxes under various classifi-
cations,"8 challengers face an uphill battle with an equal protection
claim. The difficulty is not in satisfying the first two prongs of the
test,69 but instead rests on the discrimination aspect of the third
prong. The appropriate test to determine if the different treatment
is unjustified is the "rational basis" test:
[T]here is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating
the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational ba-
sis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The
61 Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 528.
62 Id. at 528 & n.12.
63 See infra Part IV (discussing Pennsylvania court decisions addressing the constitutionality
of hotel taxes in convention center projects).
64 Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Pa. 1985) ("It is well-settled that there
is a presumption that tax enactments are constitutionally valid . . ").
65 David Schmudde, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999 L.
REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 95, 149 (1999) (footnote omitted).
Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1101; see also Torbik v. Luzerne County, 696 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Pa.
1997) (per curiam) ("[Tax challengers] must prove that the tax 'clearly, palpably and plainly
violates the Constitution.' Any uncertainty must be resolved in favor of the validity of the stat-
ute.").
67 Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 545.
68 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) ("States have large
leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in theirjudgment produce reasonable
systems of taxation.").
69 See Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 545-49 (describing classes of resident and non-resident
taxpayers and explaining the difference in treatment between these two classes).
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rule often has been stated to be that the classification "must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
,,70object of the legislation.
When it is applied in tax cases, the rational basis test often becomes a
benefit/burden test specifying that "a class of taxpayers generally suf-
fers discrimination when the burden of a tax is unjustifiably greater
than its benefit.,
71
2. Due Process Clause
A state may enact a tax that does not violate the Due Process
Clause if two conditions are met: "a 'minimal connection' between
the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relation-
ship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate
values of the enterprise. 72 Given that a hotel tax is assessed to those
physically present in the taxing state, the first requirement is easily
satisfied. 3 The second requirement involves a "simple but control-
ling question [of] whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return. 7 4 Although this question is deemed "simple," it is
anything but simple to apply.
Beyond considering the fundamental fairness of a tax,7h state
courts often use the "public purpose doctrine" to indicate that a state
taxing for private, not public, purposes will violate the Due Process
Clause. 6 The benefit/burden test used in equal protection analysis
also plays a role in due process fairness analysis.
70 Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted).
71 Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 551. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used this bene-
fit/burden analysis in Allegheny County v. Monzo. See Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1102 ("Where the bene-
fit received and the burden imposed is palpably disproportionate, a tax is ... an arbitrary form
of classification in violation of equal protection ...
Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 553.
73 See id. at 554 ("Since physical presence in the taxing state satisfies even the strictest juris-
dictional requirements,... a hotel guest is generally considered as having some 'minimum con-
nection' to the taxing State .... ").
74 Id. at 554 (quoting Wisconsin v.J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). Courts have used
this question in the Commerce Clause challenge to hotel taxes. See infra note 85.
75 The concept of fundamental fairness is the basic analysis undertaken to determine if the
second due process requirement has been satisfied. See Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 554-55
("[D]ue process is concerned with whether the tax is fundamentally fair.").
76 Id. at 556.
See Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. 1985) ("Where the benefit re-
ceived and the burden imposed is palpably disproportionate, a tax is... a taking without due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution .... .").
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3. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause challenge to hotel taxes involves the appli-
cation of the dormant Commerce Clause, which "'negates' state regu-
lation of commerce by preventing local governments from engaging
in economic isolationism or protectionism through taxation."" Un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause, a tax is valid "when the tax [1] is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
[2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."79 Before a hotel tax is put to this four-part test, the first hurdle
is to demonstrate that occupying a hotel room involves interstate
commerce and is therefore subject to scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause. s° If this hurdle is overcome, those challenging the tax must
show that it violates at least one of the four prongs above. In cases in-
volving longer than a brief hotel stay, challengers to the tax will have
a difficult time arguing that occupying a hotel room does not have a
substantial nexus with the taxing state." It is equally unlikely that a• 82
court will find the tax to be unfairly apportioned. Previous chal-
lenges to hotel taxes under the Commerce Clause have focused on
the third and fourth prongs of the test.83 However, these arguments
have also failed because the hotel tax is found not to discriminate if it
is the same for residents and nonresidents84 and courts are likely to
find some fairly related service provided by the state in return.85
4. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause "was designed to insure to a
citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which
78 Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 529.
79 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
80 See Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 529-30 (arguing that "staying in a hotel infers that one is
more or less 'on the move' from state to state" and could be considered interstate commerce
for Commerce Clause purposes).
81 See id. at 532-34 (outlining numerous cases that illustrate a substantial nexus).
82 See id. at 534-36 (demonstrating that a hotel tax is most likely internally and externally
consistent, which is a requirement to be fairly apportioned).
83 See, e.g., Paustian v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth., 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 16, 29 (Ct. C.P. 1988)
(analyzing the third and fourth criteria because tax challengers conceded the first two require-
ments).
See, e.g., id. at 29-30 (indicating that "[e]qual treatment of interstate commerce is the
fundamental test of [the third prong]" and resolving the issue in favor of the hotel tax because
it equally affects "resident or nonresident").
See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (using the "simple controlling question [of] whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask return" for the fourth prong and finding fairly related ser-
vices in "transportation, and police and fire protection" that are offered "to all those persons in
the jurisdiction, including tourists, at any given time").
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the citizens of State B enjoy. 8 6 This clause will invalidate a tax only if
the tax restricts a privileged activity in a way that does not involve a
substantial state interest. In the context of hotel taxes, two privi-
leged activities are possibly implicated: the right to travel and the
right to conduct business. Yet it is unclear whether the restrictions
on these activities involve a substantial state interest.
88
B. Who Has Standing to Challenge Hotel Taxes?
When considering who has a right to challenge the assessment of
hotel taxes, the easy answer is: those who pay the tax (i.e., the hotel
guests). Many commentators focus the challenge to hotel taxes on
the fact that nonresidents bear the brunt of the tax burden. 9 Simi-
larly, those who support the use of hotel taxes to fund a convention
center believe that only the taxpayers should be able to challenge the
tax. The hotels that must collect the tax, however, also have a legiti-
mate concern with the enactment of these taxes. Not only can the
increased tax hinder a hotel's decision to increase its room rates,90
but it can also effectively cause a hotel to fund its own competition. 91
For these reasons, the hotels collecting the tax often have standing to
challenge its enactment.
9
2
86 Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 558 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
87 See id. at 558-59. Nemerofsky states:
[I]t is necessary to undertake a two-step inquiry. "First, the activity in question must be
'sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation'".... "Second, if the challenged restric-
tion deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege... [the Supreme Court] will invali-
date it only if... the restriction is not closely related to the advancement of a substantial
state interest."
Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) and Supreme Court of
Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 65 (1988), respectively).
s8 See id. at 560-62 (discussing the various rationales used by the Supreme Court in enforc-
ingsthe Privileges and Immunities Clause).
9 See Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 527 ("It doesn't seem fair that municipalities can impose
hefty hotel taxes on their out-of-town guests to fund local 'pet' projects.. . .") (emphasis added);
Schmudde, supra note 65, at 100, 105 ("Taxes are imposed on those areas where a nonresident is
most likely to partake-hotels and rental cars.... The perception of local authorities and the
courts has been that these 'foreigners,' the nonresidents, are using the [convention center] and
therefore should pay for it.") (emphasis added). In fact, nonresident hotel guests, or potential
hotel guests, have brought actions to challenge hotel taxes. See, e.g., Paustian, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th
at 18 ("Plaintiffs... shall be certified as representative of the members of class A, which shall
consist of: 'All non-residents.., who have, or in the future will, stay overnight in a hotel room
subject to the [hotel tax used to fund a convention center] ....'").
0 See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Pa. 1985) (finding that the ho-
tel tax "discouraged [the hotel] from raising its rates because the tax increases the room rental
fee").
91 See, e.g., id. ("[T]he imposition of the tax causes the hotels outside of the City of Pitts-
burgh to finance their competitors located in the City of Pittsburgh. .. ."). For another exam-
ple of hotels effectively funding their competition, see infra Part IV.B.2.
92 See, e.g., Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1100 (finding that the hotel had standing to challenge the tax
because the hotel had a direct, substantial, and immediate interest in the tax and because the
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C. Appropriate Constitutional Challenges to Hotel Taxes Funding
Convention Center Projects
Often, the opponents of hotel taxes being used to fund a conven-
tion center are the local hotels that must collect the tax . Given the
possible constitutional challenges outlined above, these opponents
are essentially limited to the equal protection and due process argu-
ments. The local hotels are not citizens of another state; therefore,
the privileges and immunities challenge does not apply. Likewise,
the Commerce Clause argument is difficult to apply when local ho-
tels, and not out-of-state residents, challenge the hotel tax as "eco-
nomic isolationism or protectionism. "14 To prevail in a challenge of
hotel taxes funding a convention center project, local hotels must
demonstrate that the burden of the tax outweighs the benefit, which
would indicate either an equal protection or due process violation.95
IV. CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA INVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO HOTEL TAXES FUNDING CONVENTION CENTER PROJECTS
A. Background
Pennsylvania provides a good example of how courts have evalu-
ated the use of hotel taxes to fund convention center projects. Chal-
lenges to such projects have been decided in Pittsburgh (Allegheny
County v. Monzo 5), Philadelphia (Leventhal v. City of Philadelphia
7),
Wilkes-Barre (Torbik v. Luzerne County 9 ), Reading (Eways v. Board of
Commissioners), and Lancaster (Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster 00).
Although these are state cases, the Pennsylvania courts evaluated the
local hotels' challenges to the enactment of hotel taxes not only on
state constitutional grounds, but also on U.S. constitutional grounds.
The challenges to these hotel taxes began in Allegheny County.
In late 1977, Allegheny County, pursuant to the Hotel Room Rental
hotel was "significantly affected and harmed by the operation of the tax"); cf Larmnec Inv. Co. v.
Fort Wayne-Allen Co. Convention & Tourism Auth., 603 F. Supp. 1210, 1220-21 (N.D. Ind.
1985) (finding that the hotel had standing to pursue only its equal protection claim).
93 See infra Part IV (discussing the constitutional challenges of local hotels in Pennsylvania).
94 See Nemerofsky, supra note 5, at 529 (discussing the isolationism rationale behind the
dormant Commerce Clause).
15 See supra notes 71, 77 (discussing the benefit/burden analysis in Monzo).
500 A.2d 1096 (Pa. 1985).
97 542 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988).
98 696 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1997).
717 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
100 801 A.2d 469 (Pa. 2002).
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Tax Statute, 0' enacted a hotel tax to fund a convention center in
downtown Pittsburgh.0 2 A hotel located near the county dividing line
challenged the constitutionality of the hotel tax.O' After determining
that the hotel had standing to challenge the tax104 and recognizing
the presumption of constitutionality,'0 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated the hotel tax using equal protection, due process,
uniformity, and special legislation arguments:
[T] he subject taxing scheme "is at once a taking of private property with-
out due process of law, an arbitrary form of classification, an appropria-
tion of money from one group to the benefit of another, that it is un-
equal in its operation or effect upon similar businesses, and that it is local
or special legislation contrary to both the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."
0 6
The court's equal protection and due process arguments focused on
the benefit/burden analysis:
Where the benefit received and the burden imposed is palpably dis-
proportionate, a tax is not only a taking without due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also an
arbitrary form of classification in violation of equal protection ....
In light of the foregoing principles, it becomes patently clear that the
legislation in question does not pass constitutional muster. An examina-
tion of the incidence of this tax and its effects establishes that a substan-
tial portion (perhaps a majority) of the class taxed are afforded no bene-
fits whatsoever, while being significantly burdened.
0 7
While the court's ruling in Monzo could have been seen as a seri-
ous threat to future hotel taxes being used to fund convention cen-
ters, in fact, the Monzo decision appears to have provided the argu-
t0 Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1097 n.1 (citing 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4970.2 (1977), which authorizes
the enactment of a hotel tax in second class counties to "be used for all purposes which a public
authority may determine to be reasonably necessary to the support, operation and maintenance
of a convention center or exhibition hall").
102 Id. at 1097-98, 1104.
103 Id. at 1098.
104 Id. at 1100; see supra note 92.
105 Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1101 ("It is well-settled that there is a presumption that tax enactments
are constitutionally valid and that the burden of proving invalidity is upon the person challeng-
ing the tax.").
106 Id. at 1106 (quoting the trial court's opinion).
107 Id. at 1102, 1104. Likewise, the benefit/burden analysis illustrated a violation of the state
uniformity standards. Id. at 1102-04 (citing the Pennsylvania Constitution's provision on uni-
form taxation and holding that the tax's burden outweighed the benefits conferred on the af-
fected class). The court also found that the statute authorizing the hotel tax was special legisla-
tion prohibited by the state's constitution because it applied only to second class counties and
Allegheny County was the only second class county in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1105-06 ("Due to the
limited duration of the statute, there is no possibility that any other county would achieve sec-
ond class status .... The result is that the statute enacted and the tax imposed is for the pur-
pose of funding one convention center in the entire Commonwealth.").
[Vol. 7:2
0UNCONVENTIONAL DECISIONS
ments required to survive a constitutional challenge. In 1986, Penn-
sylvania enacted the Convention Center Authority Act ("1986 Act").... 108
authorizing first class cities to impose a hotel tax to fund a conven-
tion center.'0 As the only first class city in Pennsylvania,"0 Philadel-
phia enacted such a hotel tax."' Using the same general arguments
as in Monzo (i.e., equal protection, due process, uniformity, and spe-
cial legislation), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled the tax con-
stitutional in Leventhal v. City of Philadelphia."2 To distinguish its deci-
sion from Monzo, the court noted several differences in the specific
facts of the case. First, the court mentioned that unlike the hotel in
Monzo, which was near the county border and fifteen miles from
downtown, the hotel in this case was near the Philadelphia Interna-
tional Airport and only seven miles from the convention center" 3
Next, the court pointed to the evidence that "all [hotels in Philadel-
phia] stand to benefit from the proposed convention center., "1 4  Fi-
nally, the court dismissed the special legislation argument because
the legislature enacting the Act made findings as to the specific bene-
fits of a convention center in a first class city.
Interestingly, the court used Pannell Kerr Forster's" 6 feasibility
study to support the finding that the convention center would benefit
hotels throughout Philadelphia." 7 As previously discussed, conven-
tion center feasibility studies often miss the mark on their predic-
tions, ' as was the case with the Pennsylvania Convention Center in
108 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 1997) ("[Cities] containing a population of one mil-
lion or over shall constitute the first class.").
109 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 16,201-16,224 (West 1998) (repealed 2002).
It Leventhal v. City of Phila., 542 A.2d 1328, 1330 (Pa. 1988).
I PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 19-2400 to -2405 (1986).
112 542 A.2d at 1335 (finding "no constitutional infirmity in either the Tax, or its enabling
Act").
13 Id. at 1331-32.
114 Id. at 1333 (noting that in Monzo "[t]here was no proof of any kind-either legislative
findings or factual evidence-that the Pittsburgh Convention Center would benefit the
county").
115 See id. at 1334-35 (citing the legislature's findings that linked Pennsylvania's general wel-
fare with the promotion of business and tourism in first class cities).
16 Pannell Kerr Forster ("PKF") is one of a group of accounting and consulting firms often
hired by cities to evaluate the feasibility of convention centers. See supra Part 11A and note 37
(discussing the use of accounting and consulting firms to develop feasibility studies that forecast
positive results from increased convention space).
117 Leventha, 542 A.2d at 1333-34. The PKF report indicated that hotels throughout Phila-
delphia would benefit by "overflow convention demand and displaced hotel room de-
mand.., from the increased demand generated by the new convention center." Id. at 1334.
"The overflow demand that will not be accommodated by center city hotels is estimated to aver-
age 24,200 room-nights annually from 1992 to 1996." Id. at 1334 n.6.
11 See supra Part II.A.
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Philadelphia." 9 In finding the hotel tax constitutional, the court also
emphasized the 1986 Act's legislative findings on the benefits of a
convention center, 20 which were not sufficient in Monzo.12' The court
noted:
The Legislature made specific findings that: (a) the general welfare of
this Commonwealth is dependent upon the continual encouragement,
development, growth and expansion of business, commerce and tourism
within the Commonwealth; (b) the development of a major convention
center is most appropriate in a city of the first class; (c) the purpose of
such a center should be the promotion of business and tourism in such a
city; and (d) the development of such a convention center will provide
benefits to the hotel industry throughout the entire area of such a city
where such a center is developed."'
In Monzo, the court noted the appropriate legislative finding: "t] hat
the purpose and intent of this act being to benefit the people of this
Commonwealth by among other things, increasing their commerce
and prosperity, and not to unnecessarily.., burden or interfere with exist-
ing business by the establishment of competitive enterprises.",23 Aware of the
Monzo decision, the legislature was careful in drafting the 1986 Act to
avoid the result in Monzo.124 Notably, the legislative findings in the
1986 Act did not include the limitinj provision regarding the burden
to existing business found in Monzo.'
The Leventhal court also noted:
There was evidence presented that smaller counties lack many fea-
tures necessary to attract major conventions. Meeting planners of the
119 Evaluating the PKF report's predictions about the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Sand-
ers finds:
Convention-center attendance was roughly in line with PKF's predictions. The problem
comes with hotel-room demand. Rather than the 700,000 room nights predicted by
PKF's feasibility study, total room nights in 1996 and 1997 were below 500,000, and
nearly half of that attendance is from the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
... And, while national conventions have chosen to meet in the city, their delegates
do not stay long. The average stay of convention attendees is 1.5 nights-half of the fig-
ure assumed in the feasibility study.... [T]he Pennsylvania Convention Center is filled,
but largely with local and regional visitors who stay only briefly and spend little.
Sanders, Follies, supra note 37, at 67-68.
120 See Leventhal 542 A.2d at 1335 ("These legislative findings are given great weight by this
Court....").
12 See Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 1985) ("Neither the legislative
history nor the trial testimony indicates any reason or peculiar need of the class of counties au-
thorized to enact the tax.")
122 Leventhal 542 A.2d at 1334-35 (citing 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 16,202 (West 1998) (re-
pealed 2002)).
23 Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1106 (emphasis added) (citing General State Authority Act, 1949 Pa.
Laws 372 (amended 1961) (codified at 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1707.4 (2004))).
124 See Leventha 542 A.2d at 1334 ("The drafters of the Act were aware of Monzo when they
drafted this legislation.... The General Assembly spent numerous hours debating the merits of
building a convention center in Philadelphia. ..
125 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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major conventions and trade shows seek major city locations for their
events for several reasons, including prestige, convenience to major
transportation and communication facilities, and availability of cultural,
shopping, dining, and entertainment attractions.1
26
Despite this recognition, the court later upheld similar hotel taxes in
smaller markets without noting the potential difficulties these smaller
markets can face.127
In Torbik v. Luzerne County and Eways v. Board of Commissioners, ho-
tels in Luzerne and Berks counties challenged the constitutionality of
the Third Class County Convention Center Authority Act of 1994
("1994 Act") ,12 which authorized the creation of a convention center• 129
authority and the use of hotel taxes to fund a convention center
project. Again, the courts in both cases ruled the hotel tax constitu-
tional. 3 1 As in Leventhal, the legislative findings regarding the bene-
fits of a convention center played a significant role in these deci-
sions. 13
2
B. Lancaster County
While the rationale and benefit/burden analysis in the previous
cases are questionable at best, the outcome in Pennsylvania's most
recent case-Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster-is startling. The deci-
sion to uphold the assessment of a hotel tax in Lancaster County to
help fund a convention center project in downtown Lancaster 13 may
126 Leventha4 542 A.2d at 1335 (citation omitted).
127 For examples of such cases, see Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster, 801 A.2d 469 (Pa.
2002); Torbik v. Luzerne County, 696 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1997); Eways v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 717 A.2d
8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.
128 No. 1994-162, §§ 1-24, 1994 Pa. Laws 1375, 1375-1401 (codified at 16 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13,101-13,124) (repealed 1999).
1 Id. § 4, 1994 Pa. Laws at 1379.
ISO Id. § 23, 1994 Pa. Laws at 1398.
1 See Torbik, 696 A.2d at 1149 ("'Ne conclude that the hotel room rental tax provision of the
[1994] Act ... [is] constitutional."); Eways, 717 A.2d at 17 (concluding that the benefit of the
tax outweighs the burden to hotel owners).
3 See Torbik, 696 A.2d at 1146 ("[T]he legislature made a public policy decision that the
Convention Center will provide benefits to the local and state economy."); Eways, 717 A.2d at 17
("The legislative findings in that Act were that the development of convention centers will en-
courage and stimulate economic development in the area surrounded by the convention center
and, once again, we will defer to those findings.").
135 Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster, 801 A.2d 469, 478 (Pa.) ("Bold Corp. IV') (upholding
the trial court's benefit/burden analysis favoring the convention center project), vacating 790
A.2d 1099 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) ("Bold Corp. III") (remanding the case to the trial court "for a
proper benefit and burden analysis, including necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law"), remanded to 809 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (unpublished table decision) (affirm-
ing trial court's decision). In these cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Commonwealth
Court evaluated the trial court's decision to uphold the hotel tax. See Bold Corp. v. County of
Lancaster, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. 502 (Ct. C.P. 2001) ("Bold Corp. I) (upholding the constitu-
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not be surprising on its face given the cases after Monzo. The unique
facts of this case, however, highlight the troubling pattern of finding
these hotel taxes constitutional.
In 1998, the city of Lancaster unveiled its revitalization strategy,
including a proposed downtown convention center.3 4 When it be-
came apparent that the Lancaster County Commissioners planned to
create a convention center authoriy and pass a hotel tax to fund the
project pursuant to the 1994 Act,' ' local hotels informed the com-
missioners that the 1994 Act did not give them the authority to enact
the tax.1 6 Lancaster County already had approximately 72,000 square
feet of convention center space at the Lancaster Host Resort and
Convention Center, and the 1994 Act's scope was limited to counties
without existing convention centers in excess of 40,000 square feet.
37
Despite this information, on September 15, 1999, the Lancaster
County Commissioners approved the formation of the Lancaster
County Convention Center Authority ("LCCCA") and passed a 5%
hotel tax to help fund the convention center project."'
1. Special Legislation
In October 1999, State Senator Gibson Armstrong proposed an
amendment to the 1994 Act in House Bill 148 ("Armstrong Amend-
ment") , 39 which originally involved only county appropriations for
Flag Day and payments to historical societies. The legislature en-
tionality of the hotel tax); Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. 171 (Ct. C.P.
2000) ("Bold Corp. 1) (sustaining the county's preliminary objections).
13 Ernest Schreiber, Lancaster City Renewal Plan Includes Business Parks, Convention Site,
LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb. 18, 1998, at Al.
1 Third Class County Convention Center Authority Act §§ 1-24, 1994 Pa. Laws at 1375-
1401.
136 See Ernest Schreiber, Hoteliers Question Legality of Room Tax, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Sept. 16,
1999, at Al (referencing a September 10, 1999 letter to the commissioners).
137 § 2(c) (1), 1994 Pa. Laws at 1377 ("This act shall not apply to a county which has an exist-
ing convention center which covers an area of more than 40,000 square feet.").
Ernest Schreiber & Todd R. Weiss, To Applause, Hotel Tax Passes: New Levy Allows Downtown
Project to Move Ahead, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Sept. 15, 1999, at Al. This 5% hotel tax is composed
of a 3.9% hotel room rental tax and a 1.1% hotel excise tax. Bold Corp. IV, 801 A.2d at 471. All
of the revenues from the 1.1% hotel excise tax will go to the Pennsylvania Dutch Convention
and Visitors Bureau ("PDCVB") to promote tourism in Lancaster County. Id. The revenues
from the 3.9% hotel room rental tax rate are divided so that 80% will go to the LCCCA to fund
the convention center project and 20% will go to the PDCVB to promote tourism in Lancaster
County. Id.
1 Bold Corp. III, 790 A.2d 1099, 1102 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
140 Compare H.B. 148 (Pa. 1999) (introduced Jan. 27, 1999) (involving only county appropria-
tions for Flag Day and payments to historical societies), available at http://
www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUOI/LI/BI/BT/1999/0/HBO148PO136.pdf, with H.B. 148 (Pa. 1999)
(introduced Oct. 19, 1999) (amending the original House Bill 148 by adding the new version of
the Third Class County Convention Center Authority Act and repealing the 1994 Act), available
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acted the Armstrong Amendment as the new Third Class County
Convention Center Authority Act ("1999 Act") in November 1999.'
The only significant difference between the 1999 Act and the 1994
Act was the defined scope.141 While the 1994 Act specified that it
"shall not apply to a county which has an existing convention center
which covers an area of more than 40,000 square feet," 43 the 1999 Act
specified that it "shall not apply to a county which has an existing
convention center owned by, leased by or operated by an existing authority
or the Commonwealth which covers an area of more than forty thousand
square feet."14
In their lawsuit opposing the tax, the hotels argued that the Arm-
strong Amendment was "impermissible special legislation passed
solely for the benefit of Lancaster County."' 5 The county pointed to
the language of the 1994 Act defining a convention center as "[a]ny
land, improvement, structure, building, or part thereof, or property
interest therein, whether owned by or leased by or to or otherwise acquired by
an authority"'' 46 to demonstrate that the scope limitation of the 1994
Act did not apply to counties with existing private convention cen-
ters. 47 The legislative history, however, supports a conclusion that
the 1994 Act, which did not define "existing convention center," did
not apply to counties with existing private convention centers and,
more specifically, applied only to Berks and Luzerne counties:
[T]his is a "may" bill, and it is a bill that is limited to third class counties
with an exclusion of third class counties that already have a convention center of
40,000 square feet, or a third class county that has a joint planning com-
mission.
•.. What we are asking for here is very limited authority for two coun-
ties, basically Berks and Luzerne .... 148
at http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/1999/0/HBO148P2489.pdf. Thanks to the
Lancaster hotels' attorneys for raising this point.
141 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2399.1-2399.23 (West 2001).
142 See Bold Corp. 1, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. 171, 173 (Ct. C.P. 2000) ("The re-enactment revised
only the scope section of the Act.. ").
143 Third Class County Convention Center Authority Act, No. 1994-162, § 2(c) (1), 1994 Pa.
Laws 1375, 1377 (codified at 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13,102(c)(1)) (repealed 1999).
144 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2399.2 (c) (1) (emphasis added).
145 Bold Corp. II1, 790 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). The hotels sought a ruling
similar to Monzo, where the court decided that the statute was special legislation because "the
tax imposed is for the purpose of funding one convention center in the entire Commonwealth."
Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1105-06 (Pa. 1985).
146 § 3, 1994 Pa. Laws at 1377 (emphasis added).
147 Schreiber, supra note 136 (discussing the views of the county's legal advisor).
148 51 PA. LEGIS. J.-S. 2984-85 (1994) (statement of Sen. Brightbill) (emphasis added).
Thanks to the Lancaster hotels' attorneys for raising this point.
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Likewise, the Armstrong Amendient's attempt to clarify149 the 1994
Act indicates that the original intent of the 1994 Act was the opposite
of the clarification. 5 0 Despite these arguments and the suspect tim-
ing of the Armstrong Amendment, the trial court dismissed the ho-
tels' special legislation claim.' 5'
2. Benefit/Burden Analysis for the Public/Private Project
At the time of the trial in December 2000, the convention center
project involved more than simply building a new convention center.
Along with the construction of a 100,000 to 114,000 square-foot con-
vention center, the proposal included an adjoining 294-room first
class hotel ("convention center hotel")."' In fact, "construction of
both facilities is interdependent; the convention center will be built
only if the adjacent hotel is built and the hotel will be built only if the
convention center is built."' ' The county stressed that the conven-
tion center and the convention center hotel were financially inde-
pendent from each other and, more important, that the convention
center hotel would be privately owned and financed. 5 4 Penn Square
Partners ("PSP") is the private group developing the convention cen-
ter hotel. 5
19 See H.B. 148, § 5 (Pa. 1999) (introduced Oct. 19, 1999) ("The General Assembly declares
that the intention of the [1999 Act] is to consolidate and clarify existing law. The [1999 Act]
shall not be construed to change existing law."), available at http://www2.legis.state.pa.us/
WUO1/LI/BI/BT/1999/0/HBO148P2489.pdf.
150 In St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Township of Potter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with a
statute clarification and held that "[i]t is elementary that the legislature cannot create authority
retroactively simply by passing 'clarifying' legislation. The intent of the legislature must be de-
termined as of the time the original act was passed. If anything, the [clarified] Act indicates
that the previous statute meant the exact contrary." 157 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1959). Thanks to
the Lancaster hotels' attorneys for raising this point.
151 Bold Corp. I, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. 171, 184 (Ct. C.P. 2000) (dismissing the special legisla-
tion claim-Count V of the complaint).
152 Bold Corp. /X, 801 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa. 2002). Initially, the LCCCA used a feasibility study
prepared by Ernst & Young to propose a public/private convention center project consisting of
a 61,000 square-foot convention center and an adjoining 281-room full-service hotel. See Mark
E. Johnson, Ridge Shows Lancaster City the Money: State Commits $15 Million to Convention Center,
INTELLIGENCERJ. (Lancaster, Pa.), Nov. 5, 1999, at Al (referencing Ernst & Young's report on
the proposed center's size and the adjoining hotel's details). Then the LCCCA hired Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers ("PwC") to determine the feasibility of a larger convention center.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, MARKET AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES FOR THE PROPOSED
CONVENTION CENTER IN DOWNTOWN LANCASTER 1 (November 2000) (on file with author). The
PwC study proposed a convention center with 100,000 to 114,000 square feet of total public
space. Id. at 60.
153 Bold Corp. IV, 801 A.2d at 471.
154 Id.
155 PSP is a "private, for-profit partnership formed by three Lancaster businesses-High Real
Estate Group, Fulton Bank and the Lancaster Newspapers Inc., publishers of the Lancaster New
Era, the Intelligencer Journal and Sunday News." Debra Erdley & Richard Gazarik, Lancaster
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In conducting the benefit/burden analysis for the hotels' due
process and equal protection claims, the trial court determined that
it had to consider both the convention center and its adjoining hotel
because of the close connection between them. 56 As in the previous
cases, the projected benefit to the existing hotels is the increased
demand for hotel rooms generated by convention center visitors.'57
The trial court recognized that the convention center hotel would
decrease the benefit received by the existing hotels' 5 ' but it did not
consider any additional burden of the new convention center 
hotel. 59
Although the trial court found that the convention center hotel "will
increase the available room supply in Lancaster County by 50,000 to
55,000 room nights per year,"' it concluded that this increased sup-
ply was not a burden to the other local hotels:
[T]he [convention center] hotel is only relevant to the extent that it
takes away any benefit from the [existing hotels] that would be derived
from the convention center .... To the extent that there are room nights
put into the market above and beyond this absorption of convention cen-
ter business, that is merely capitalism at work."'
In further explanation, the trial court stated:
The Court sympathizes with the [existing hotels] to the extent that
the market continually requires outselling your competition. However,
this is the nature of capitalism and has nothing to do with the imposition
Publisher Among Investors, TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Nov. 10, 2002, at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/
x/search/s_101775.html. High Real Estate Group is composed of High Associates, Ltd.; High
Construction Company; Greenfield Architects, Ltd.; and High Investors, Ltd. See High Real Es-
tate Group, at http://www.highrealestate.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
156 Bold Corp. II, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. 502, 511 (Ct. C.P. 2001) ("The Court is satisfied that the
connection between the convention center and the adjoining hotel is so quid pro quo that each
must be considered in the benefit/burden analysis.").
157 LCCCA hired PwC to "determine whether there was market demand for a convention
center in downtown Lancaster, quantify any such demand and analyze the financial and eco-
nomic impacts of the recommended facility." Bold Corp. IV 801 A.2d at 471. For a discussion of
the unreliability of such feasibility studies, see supra Part II.A.
158 According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
The [trial] court found that events held at the proposed convention center could rea-
sonably be expected to generate 20,000 to 30,000 hotel room nights annually. Approxi-
mately 45% of those rooms are expected to be booked by the proposed new hotel, leav-
ing 11,000 to 16,000 room nights per year to spill over to existing convention-quality
hotels.
Bold Corp. IV, 801 A.2d at 472.
159 Bold Corp. II, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. at 511 ("The only relevant burden [the convention cen-
ter hotel) will have is the extent to which it takes away the benefits of the convention center
from the other Lancaster County hotels.").
160 Bold Corp. IIl, 790 A.2d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). This increased supply of room
nights available in Lancaster County is not offset by an equivalent increased demand from con-
vention center visitors. See supra note 158.
161 Bold Corp. 11, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. at 511.
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of the tax itself. Thus, the extent to which a new hotel will create addi-
tional competition for the [existing hotels] is irrelevant.1
6
1
This capitalism argument is difficult to justify. How can the increased
competition from the convention center hotel be ignored when the
convention center hotel is not a strictly private project?163 Without
the assessment of the hotel tax, there would be no convention center
project. And, without the convention center project, there would be
no convention center hotel.
Complicating this benefit/burden analysis are the details of the
public/private partnership, including some changes to the arrange-
ment after the trial court's initial decision emphasized that "[e]ven
though the hotel will not come without the convention center, the ho-
tel is not to be funded with public monies. Thus, the [existing hotels] are
not funding the hotel that will adjoin the proposed convention cen-
ter." 64 The convention center hotel developer has received public
money in the form of no-interest loans from the City of Lancaster
Redevelopment Authority ("CLRA") .65 In 2000, the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development ("DCED")
gave the CLRA a $2 million grant for the convention center project.
1 66
The CLRA then loaned this money to PSP.167 The DCED then gave a
similar $2 million grant to the CLRA, which the CLRA loaned to PSP
in the fall of 2002.6 Not only does PSP not have to pay interest on
this $4 million loan, but it also does not have to repay the loan for
twenty years, if at all. 69 By February 2004, PSP had received $7.25 mil-
162 Bold Corp. V 801 A.2d 469, 475 (Pa. 2002) (quoting the trial court's Adjudication).
163 The convention center hotel is not a strictly private project because it is intertwined with
the convention center itself in a public/private endeavor. See supra notes 152-53 and accompa-
nying text.
164 Bold Corp. II, 77 Lancaster L. Rev. at 511 (emphasis added). After the public/private part-
nership changed from the arrangement presented at trial, the hotels opposed to the tax asked
for a remand to present the new evidence. Carla Di Fonzo, Convention Center Faces New Lawsuit:
Hoteliers Start Over, Say They Have New Evidence Against Room Tax, INTELLIGENCERJ. (Lancaster,
Pa.), Dec. 5, 2002, at Al. Because the court suggested a new trial instead of a remand, the ho-
tels filed a new lawsuit. Id. The trial court denied the request for a new trial, indicating that the
hotels "had their chance to 'fully litigate their claims of the hotel room tax's constitutional inva-
lidity.'" John M. Spidaliere, County Judge Tells Hoteliers Case Closed, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Mar. 20,
2003, at B1. Ultimately, the hotels dropped this second lawsuit because the county threatened
them with a countersuit, and they were concerned with the "high cost of defending themselves
against a countersuit that would be funded by [the hotel] tax." Gail Rippey, Hoteliers Call off
Lawsuit, SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), Aug. 10, 2003, at Al.
1 Erdley & Gazarik, supra note 155.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
9 Id. PSP may not have to repay the loan because this loan is set up to be subordinate to
any other debt taken on by PSP. Id.
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lion in redevelopment loans from the city.7 ° PSP also plans to seek
"$5 million in tax increment financing and $1 million from the city in
waived fees and other incentives."''7' In addition, High Associates-an
affiliate of one of the partners of PSP172 -has received $1.4 million in
professional and advisory fees from the LCCCA. 7 s
The concessions the LCCCA has given to PSP also blur the pub-
lic/private line. Knowing that the feasibility study indicated that the
convention center would probably not succeed without an adjoining
hotel,14 PSP threatened to abandon the convention center hotel plan
if the LCCCA did not choose the same management firm PSP had
chosen for the convention center hotel. 75  Despite LCCCA's own
Tourist Industry Task Force's recommendation of SMG, 76 in Septem-
ber 2001, the LCCCA chose Interstate Hotels to manage the conven-
tion center.
77
Shared management was just one of PSP's proposals to take ad-
vantage of public subsidies. PSP also proposed shared meeting space,
as well as collaborative purchasing and design efforts.7 8 An agree-
ment with the LCCCA allowed PSP to forgo spending for the meet-
ing, kitchen, and ballroom space required to build a first class hotel.
Instead of PSP incurring these construction costs, the LCCCA will
build the necessary space in the convention center and lease it to the
convention center hotel for only $100 a year for ninety-nine years.179
Along with this public subsidy, the convention center will receive only
five percent-a share considered low in the hotel industry-of the
gross food and beverage sales for the use of the leased spaces by the
convention center hotel.180 Because of these special considerations
given to PSP by the LCCCA, the hotel tax effectively helps fund the
170 Bernard Harris &John M. Spidaliere, Penn Sq. Project Leaders Unite, But Seek $18M More from
Pa., LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
171 Id.
172 See supra note 155.
173 See Not-Yet-Existent Convention Center Spends $1.4M on Consultants, Feb. 25, 2004 (question-
ing the $1.4 million payment when the project has not been moving forward), at
http://www.thewgalchannel.com/news/2873531/detail.html.
174 See Bernard Harris & Tom Murse, Single Operator for Hotel, Center, LANCASTER NEW ERA,
Sept. 12, 2001, at D12.
175 See id. ("[PSP] had threatened to abandon the hotel plan if Interstate [Hotels] was not
chosen to operate both sides of the public-private project.").
176 Id. The LCCCA's task force recommended SMG because, as "the largest operator of pub-
lic meeting space, [it] could attract many more events to the center." Id. Along with SMG, the
task force also considered Interstate Hotels, but found that Interstate Hotels had "comparatively
little experience." Id. In addition, the task force argued that using Interstate Hotels posed a
conflict of interest because it would have an incentive to favor the adjoining hotel. Id.
177 Id.
178 Di Fonzo, supra note 164.
179 Rippey, supra note 3.
180 Id.
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private convention center hotel. That is, the hotel tax forces existing
hotels to fund their competition.
Not only does the tax help to fund the private convention center
hotel, but it also may be used directly to fund another hotel. In July
2004, the LCCCA considered buying the Brunswick Hotel in down-
town Lancaster just blocks from the proposed site of the convention
center and adjoining convention center hotel.1"' Although the
LCCCA voted not to buy the Brunswick Hotel, it has not ruled out
such a purchase in the future. In fact, the LCCCA views this hotel
as "an important factor in the overall success of the convention cen-
ter project. It will be an overflow hotel where guests who don't want
to pay Marriott prices go if they want to stay in downtown ....
With this view, the LCCCA is openly considering the possibility of us-
ing the hotel tax proceeds to purchase a hotel that will compete with
other local hotels for the convention center hotel overflow. As with
the private convention center hotel, the local hotels, through the ho-
tel tax, may help to fund more competition in the future.
CONCLUSION
With a better understanding of the shortcomings of projected
benefits of convention center projects and the implications of in-
creasing hotel taxes, it is time for courts to reconsider the constitu-
tionality of funding convention centers with hotel taxes. At a mini-
mum, a serious overhaul to the benefit/burden analysis in due
process and equal protection claims is needed. No longer should the
feasibility studies from hired consultants play such a prominent role
in assessing the benefits of convention center projects. In addition,
because it is too easy for politicians to support taxing visitors for local
projects,'84 courts should closely scrutinize legislative findings.
An even stronger case for unconstitutionality exists when the con-
vention center project involves an adjoining hotel in a public/private
partnership. Here, the presumption of constitutionality cannot
stand.
A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Con-
stitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government. The
word has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from
one group for the benefit of another... The exaction cannot be wrested out
of its setting, denominated an excise for raising revenue and legalized by
181 John M. Spidaliere, Brunswick Buy Is Out for Now, LANCASTER NEW ERA, July 20, 2004, at B1.
182 Id. (quoting the LCCCA's executive director, who said: "I wouldn't rule anything out.
The move today was more about timing than anything else.").
18 Id.
1 AM. ECON. GROUP, INC., supra note 24, at 8 ("[Hotel] taxes are often used by politicians as
a way of exporting the tax burden out of the state or local area.").
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ignoring its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a de-
sired end. To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all others than we
can see and understand."'
Until it is proven that the so-called private hotel will not receive fund-
ing from the convention center, directly or indirectly, the burdens of
the project should be presumed to outweigh the benefits to the exist-
ing hotels. Likewise, any decision upholding the constitutionality of
the hotel tax should be contingent on the continued separation of
the public/private relationship to ensure that the hotel tax will not
effectively fund the competition.
185 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936) (emphasis added).
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